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IJRING 1974 many uncertainties existed in the
implementation of monetary policy. Foremost was the
likely course of economic activity during the year.
Economic forecasters, both private and government,
badly misjudged actual economic developments. Fore-
casts throughout the year were quite varied and were
frequently revised.
Another uncertainty involved the question of the
appropriate rate of growth of the monetary aggre-
gates. Some analysts viewed the downturn in output
to be the result of supply constraints, and concluded
that, in view of the accelerating rate of inflation, a
slower rate of growth of money was appropriate.
Other analysts held the view that the cause of the
decline in rcal output was inadequate aggregate de-
mand, and thereby urged more rapid monetary
expansion.
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
was thus faced with an unusually high degree of un-
certainty in adopting monetary actions which were
considered consistent with the agreed-upon goals for
the economy.1 Monetary actions were taken which
the Committee considered consistent with long-run
objectives for monetary growth. Specific instructions
were given to the Trading Desk to achieve, over
periods of two months, growth of RPDs and the
money stock (both M1 and M2) within specified
ranges, and to maintain the Federal funds rate within
specified limits until the subsequent meeting of the
Committee.2 Money, however, frequently did not
grow as was planned, which was another problem
which plagued the FOMC throughout much of 1974.
This article first reviews forecasts of private and
government economists, including the staff of the
FOMC, throughout the year and traces the gradual
deterioration in the outlook. Next, the question of un-
certainty regarding the appropriate growth of the
money stock is examined. Finally, the uncertainty
regarding the response of the money stock to policy
actions is discussed.
In the closing days of 1973, forecasters were hedg-
ing their predictions more than usual because of the
uncertain impact of the oil embargo and the asso-
ciated “energy crisis.” Most economists believed that
the U. S. economy would grow more slowly in 1974
than it did in 1973, with most of the rise in gross
national product (GNP) accounted for by prices
rather than output. This was the concensus among the
eleven economists assembled by the Conference
Board late in 1973, and was typical of the forecasts of
other leading economists.
While many foresaw much slower growth in output,
on average, in 1974, few accurately predicted the ex-
tent of the actual decline. The Conference Board
forecasted a rise in nominal GNP of just under 8 per-
cent — 5.3 percent in prices and 2.3 percent in real
growth. Actual growth in GNP during the year end-
ing fourth quarter 1974 was 6,5 percent — a 12 per-
cent increase in prices and a5percent decline in real
output.
Herbert Stein, then Chairman of the President’s
Council of Economic Advisers, predicted late in 1973
that unemployment would approach 6 percent in
1974, but not exceed that figure. James Meigs, then
vice president and economist for Argus Research Cor-
poration, projected an unemployment rate that would
peak at about 5.5 percent. The actual level of unem-
ployment in December 1974 was 7.1 percent of the
labor force.
Most people were forecasting a slowdown rather
than a recession for 1974. In December 1973 the
FOMC staff was also inclined to accept this view, but
in less specific terms: “Staff projections suggested that
economic activity would weaken further in the first
half of 1974 and that prices would rise appreciably,
in part because of curtailment in oil supplies.”
As the first quarter was drawing to a close, there
was still no agreement among private economists as
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to the extent of the slowdown in the economy. Lionel
D. Edie & Co., Investment Counselors and Economic
Consultants, estimated that real output in the first
quarter would decline at a 6.6 percent annual rate,
while econometric forecasters at Georgia State Uni-
versity anticipated a decline of only 1 percent.
Projections made in March for the second half of
1974 continued to substantially overestimate growth
in the economy. Wharton economists had one of the
“gloomiest” views, but still considerably understated
price increases and overstated real economic growth.
Recession would persist in the first half of the year,
according to W~harton,but during the second half
there would be real growth of about 1 percent. Other
private forecasters were even farther off-target than
Wharton. Data Resources expected a substantial dip
in first quarter real product growth, but forecasted a
rise at a 1.9 percent rate in the second quarter, and
by fourth quarter they foresaw real output rising at a
6.4 percent annual rate.
The FOMC staff projections at the March meeting
were somewhat more cautious than the other projec-
tions cited above. “Staff projections, like those of 4
weeks earlier, snggested that real output would
change little in the second quarter and that the rise in
prices would remain rapid.” The termination of the
embargo on oil shipments to the United States was
expected to have no more than a marginally expan-
sive impact on overall real output until the summer,
although the automobile and housing markets were
expected to strengthen sooner.
At midyear most forecasters were still apprehensive
about the prevailing economic situation, GNP had in-
creased at only a 6 percent annual rate during the first
half of 1974, with prices rising at almost an 11 percent
rate and real output (leclinrng at over a 4 percent
annual rate.
Most private forecasters continued to believe that
real output would rise slightly and that the rate of
increase in prices would slow somewhat during the
remainder of the year. First National City Bank pre-
dicted a rise in the unemployment rate to possibly 6
percent by the end of 1974, with no growth in output
during that period.
At the July meeting, the FOMC staff presented
projections suggesting that in the second half of the
year “real economic activity would grow at a minimal
pace and that prices would increase less rapidly than
in the first half.” Since an upturn in residential con-
struction was no longer expected, and a somewhat
greater decline in net exports was now anticipated,
real economic activity was projected to grow some-
what less than had been projected four weeks earlier.
In early August, Gerald Ford replaced Richard
Nixon as President. The change in Administrations
appeared to give the country a psychological hft, es-
pecially since President Ford had indicated that high
priority would he given to bringing inflation under
control.
Despite the psychological lift, the Argus Research
Corporation commented in early August that “we now
expect the consumer price index to be rising at a 10.3
per cent annual rate in the fourth quarter,” instead of
the 7.2 percent forecasted earlier. Michael Evans,
chief economist for Chase Econometrics, contended
that recession “will stay with us for the rest of the
year.”
Even as late as mid-October, forecasters were still
underestimating inflation and overstating the level of
economic activity. Herbert E. Neil, Jr., vice-president
and economist at Flarris Trust and Savings Bank,
Chicago, forecasted an unemployment rate of 6 per-
cent of the work force by the end of 1974. He also
predicted that automobile sales would decline sharply
in the fourth quarter.
Even as pessimistic as they appeared throughout
the year, most forecasters were continually more opti-
mistic than proved to be warranted, Special factors
causing the declines in real output were accurately
estimated by few, if any, economists. Thus, through-
out 1974 the Federal Open Market Committee, in
establishing monetary pohcy, was faced with great
uncertainty regarding the economic outlook.
The inaccuracies in economic forecasts left many
uncertainties regarding appropriate growth of mone-
tary aggregates during 1974. Much of the disagree-
ment among analysts regarding growth of the aggre-
gates stemmed from disagreement regarding the basic
causes of the inflation-recession situation. Those who
believed the contraction in output was induced by
insufficient demand called for more rapid monetary
growth. These analysts based their judgment on move-
ments in such measures as real money balances, in-
come velocity, and market interest rates.
Another school of thought contended that for the
most part the recession was supply-induced; continu-
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ing inflation indicated excessive aggregate demand,
and therefore called for less rapid monetary growth.
They cited the many shocks to the economy which
occurred during the year and in the immediately pre-
ceding year as factors limiting the output of goods
and services.
The January 1974 issue of First National City
Bank’s Monthly Economic Letter highlighted the con-
flict faced by policymakers last year: “To prevent
inflationfrom making the slowdown or recession even
deeper in this country, the growth of the money stock
would have to he accelerated to a rate substantially
higher than that of 1973, More rapid monetary expan-
sion, to be sure, promotes and validates inflation,”
First National City Bank also pointed out that the task
of the Federal Reserve was especially difficult during
the cyclical currents that existed then. They con-
tended that, historically, undue monetary expansion
during recessions has proved to be the “ultimate
folly.” Also, in the short run, a recession caused by
supply constraints would probably not respond to
rapid growth in the money supply.
This conflict of views was evident in the FOMC
deliberations. For example, in their dissents to the
directive adopted at the February 20 meeting, Gov-
ernors Bucher and Sheehan and President Morris
-.expressed concern about current and prospective
weakness in aggregate economic demands.” On the
other hand, President Francis in dissenting “. ..ex-
pressed the view that the over-all economic situation
was stronger than suggested by the staff projections
and that inflation remained the major long-term eco-
nomic problem.”
One group of observers advised that rapid money
growth was appropriate last year because their analy-
ses led them to attribute the downturn to insufficient
growth of aggregate demand. A continuing decrease
in real money balances, a slower growth in income
velocity, and high market interest rates were cited by
various analysts as evidence in support of the weak-
aggregate-demand view.
Real money bal-
ances (money stock divided by some index of the
price level, M/P) decreased in the last half of 1973
and continued to decrease throughout 1974. Some
analysts argued that such a decrease had a marked
retarding effect on growth of aggregate demand last
year. Their argument is as follows: People desire to
hold some given level of “real” money balances as
part of their asset portfolio. When actual real money
balances decline, and if there is no change in desired
real balances, spending on goods and services will be
restricted in an attempt to restore real money bal-
ances to the desired level. Efforts to do so would
cause a decline in total spending, output, and, ulti-
mately, the price level. The proponents of this view
argued such was the case in 1973 and 1974.
A decline in real money balances can occur tlffough
changes in either the numerator or denominator of
this expression: either the growth of nominal money
balances slows relative to the rate of change of
prices, or the rate of inflation accelerates while growth
of the money stock is relatively steady. During most
of 1974 the decline in the ratio of the money stock to
the price level was due to prices accelerating sharply
relative to growth of the money stock. In other
periods since World War II when real money bal-
ances declined preceding a recession, the money stock
was declining or was growing at a rate slower than
previously, but prices were relatively stable.
The real balance argument presents a fundamental
policy dilemma. On the one hand, in order to avoid a
severe economic contraction the monetary authorities
should increase the money stock rapidly so as to re-
store growth in real balances. On the other hand,
since the growth of money determines the rate of
inflation, an infusion of “unwanted” money svonld only
add fuel to the inflation.3 In essence, the crucial ques-
tion is whether an observed decline in real balances
is the result of a voluntary action on the part of the
public.
Income velocity
(nominal GNP divided by the money stock) in 1974
grew at a rate about half that of 1973. A group of
analysts argued that given actual money growth, this
decline in velocity growth depressed growth of ag-
gregate demand. This argument is similar to the real
money balances one, in which these measures are
used as indicators of slackening aggregate demand.
Since both measures incorporate prices and money,
they often lead to similar conclusions.
Those who advance the velocity argument assert
that velocity is a proxy measure for desired money
balances. A slower growth of velocity is said to re-
3For further explanation see Denis S. Karnosky, “Real Money
Balances: A Misleading Indicator of Monetary Policy Ac-
tions,’ this Review ( Fehroary 1974 ) -
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flect an increase in desired money balances relative to
income. It is argued that if the level of actual money
balances is constant, but individuals want to increase
their holdings of money, they will decrease their
spending on goods and services so as to achieve their
desired level of money balances.
The slower growth in velocity last year represented,
according to proponents of this view, an increase in
desired money balances relative to income; thus a
more rapid growth in the money supply should have
occurred last year if growth of aggregate demand was
not to slow down. On the other hand, the slower
growth in measured velocity during 1974 may have
been a temporary phenomenon resulting from the in-
creased economic and political uncertainty prevailing
in this period. In such a case, a faster growth in money
would have led to even greater inflation as velocity
returned to its previous trend.
From mid-March to
early July, market interest rates climbed at a steady
pace. Then, from midyear through the end of the
year, short-term interest rates declined sharply, while
long-term interest rates fell very slowly. A large group
of economists argued that such a rise in interest rates,
particularly long-term rates, represented an overly re-
strictive monetary policy tending to curtail future ag-
gregate demand. As a result of this type of analysis,
they argued for faster money growth in order to
achieve lower interest rates than the levels prevailing
during early 1974.
A counter argument is that the rapidly rising long-
term interest rates in the first half of 1974, and their
failm-e to decline significantly in the last half of the
year, was primarily the result of a lugh and increasing
rate of inflation which led to a larger inflationpremium
in market interest rates. This argument contended that
faster money growth would add to the already exces-
sive rate of inflation and, ultimately, result in even
higher interest rates,
The proponents of the interest rate view were not
impressed by the inflation premium view of high
market interest rates. For example, in analyzing mon-
etary policy in mid-1974 Professor James Tobin of
Yale University stated, “I have only tried to indicate
that the policy [of the Federal Reserve] contains
more bite and cost and risk than one might suspect
from superficial comparisons of interest rates and
rates of inflation,”4
4jarnes Tohin, “Inflation, Interest Rates, and Stock Values,”
The Morgan Guaranty Survey (July 1974), pp. 4-7.
In contrast to those holding the insufficient-aggre-
gate-demand view of the downturn, another group of
analysts argued that aggregate demand was strong, as
indicated by the accelerating inflation, but there
existed many special factors tending to limit produc-
tion of goods and services last year. This group ar-
gued that the downtui-n mainly reflected the influ-
ence of these supply factors during the first three
quarters of the year.
Early in 1974, Chairman Arthur F. Burns pre-
sented the following analysis to the Joint Economic
Committee:
The current economic slowdown, however, does not
appear to have the characteristics of a typical business
recession. To date, declines in employment and pro-
duction have been concentrated in specific industries
and regions of the country rather than spread broadly
over the economy. In some major sectors the demand
for goods and services is still rising. Capital spending
plans of business firms remain strong and so do in-
ventory demands for the many materials and com-
ponents in short supply.
Chairman Bums then concluded:
A highly expansive monetary policy would do little
to stimulate production and employment; but it would
run a serious risk of rocking financial markets, of
causing the doliar to depreciate in foreign exchange
markets, and of intensifying our already dangerous
inflationary problem.
At midyear President Darryl R. Francis, in an ad-
dress to the Steel Plate Fabricators Association, ar-
gued that
the economy is fundamentally very strong and
there is more than adequate aggregate demand to
promote real expansion. I view the slower growth
in real output after the first quarter of 1973 as being
attributable to the economy operating ‘flat-out’ at full
capacity in an environment where price and wage
controls severely reduced the efficiency of the mar-
ket system in allocating resources in the production
process.
I do not see how the existence of wide-spread
shortages of commodities and sharply rising prices
can be viewed as characteristics of weak aggregate
demand. The sharp drop in real output in the first
quarter of this year was clearly the result of the oil
boycott and related developments such as the
truckers’ strike, the allocation program, and the pres-
ence of controls on both prices and resource move-
ments. Only a few industries were affected and all
of them were energy related. Furthermore, unem-
ployment in the first few months of this year was
much smaller than one would have expected if the
sharp drop in real output had been widespread and
had resulted from fundamental weakness in the
economy.
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Throughout the year the FOMC outhued its objec-
tives concerning open market operations to the Sys-
tem Account Manager in the domestic policy direc-
tive issued at each meeting. The policy consensus and
operating instructions, as well as the dissents for each
meeting, are presented in Exhibit I. Specifically, the
directions to the Desk were in terms of a Federal
funds range during the intermeeting period and a
range of tolerance for growth of M1 and M2 over the
subsequent two months. These ranges were consid-
ered to be consistent with the FOMC’s longer-run
growth of money. The ranges set at each meeting, in
addition to the actual growth of the variables, are
shown in accompanying charts, p. 10.
Growth of M1 was very rapid in the first half of
1974, but decelerated sharply in the second half.
Short-run growth of money was frequently outside the
specified ranges during the last half of the year, which
raised questions regarding the degree of responsive-
ness of money stock to Federal Reserve actions.
At the January meeting of the FOMC, a staffanaly-
sis suggested that “growth in the demand for money
over the first half of 1974 was likely to be somewhat
greater than had been expected earlier.” It appeared
likely to the Committee that if M1 were to grow at
a rate consistent with the longer-run objectives for
monetary aggregates,5 money market conditions
would tighten somewhat in the period immediately
ahead. In response to these observations, the Commit-
tee adopted ranges of tolerance for growth rates of
Mm and M2 over the January-February period of 3 to
6 percent and 6 to 9 percent, respectively. They also
decided that “in the period until the next meeting
the weekly average Federal funds rate might be per-
mitted to vary in an orderly fashion from as low as
8% per cent to as high as 10 per cent, if necessary, in
the course of operations.”
Noting the decline in M, in January, the Commit-
tee adopted ranges of tolerance for the February-
March period which were considerably greater than
the ranges set for the January-February period. Two
special consultations occurred between the February
and March meetings. On March 1, “a majority of the
available Committee members concurred in the Chair-
5The longer-run objectives for the nionetary aggregates are
never explicitly stated in the “Record of Policy Actions.”
man’s recommendation that, in light of the marked
rise in short-tenn interest rates that had occurred
since the February meeting and of the highly sensi-
tive state of the financial markets, reserve-supplying
operations for the time being should be conducted in
a manner expected to be consistent with maintenance
of the Federal funds rate at about the 9 per cent level
that had prevailed over the preceding 3 weeks.>’
On March 11 the FOMC consensus was that “in
response to evidence that strong growth in the mone-
tary aggregates was persisting, .. .the Account Man-
ager was instructed to proceed very cautiously in op-
erations thought likely to be consistent with a rise in
the weekly average Federal funds rate above
9 per cent.”
The regular meeting in March was the first follow-
ing the election of new voting members of the FOMC.
The staff analysis suggested the following at this meet-
ing: “. ..esthnates of the likely strength of money
demands over the spring and summer and of the rela-
tionships between monetary growth rates and market
interest rates were subject to larger margins of error
than usual because of the greater uncertainty attached
to projections of nominal GNP ....“ The ranges of
growth for the aggregates for the March-April period
were lower than for the February-March period. The
Federal funds range established at the March meeting
was higher than the range set at the February
meeting.
While the Desk was supplying reserves to maintain
the Federal funds rate as desired, the money stock
was expanding at an extremely rapid rate. During
the two months prior to the April FOMC meeting,
the money stock expanded at an 11 percent annual
rate.°Also, during the intermeeting period, the prime
rate at most large commercial banks rose from 8%
percent to 10 percent.
The range of tolerance for M, for the April-May
period was 3t o7percent, which was lower than the
band set for M, for the March-April period. The
range for M, was 5½to 8½percent. A one percent-
age point range was adopted for Federal funds, with
the upper limit at 10% percent. “The longer-run
growth rate for M, accepted by the Committee was
revised upward slightly
“Subsequent to the meeting it appeared that in the
April-May period the annual rates of growth in the
monetary aggregates would be above the upper limits
6Compounded annual rate of change for the 4 weeks ending
February 13 to the 4 weeks ending April 10.
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January 21-22 In light of the foregoing developments, it is
the policy of the Federal Open Market Com-
mittee to foster financial conditions conducive
to resisting inflationory pressures, cushioning
the effects on production and employment
growing out of the oil shortage, and main-
taining equilibrium in the country’s balance
of payments.
To implement this policy, while taking account of the
forthcoming Treasury financing and of international and
domestic financial market developments, the Committee
seeks to achieve bank reserve and money market con-
ditions consistent with moderate growth in monetary
aggregates over the months ahead.
-,-Mr. Hayes and Mr. Francis indicated that they
favored no change in the Committee’s longer-run
objectives for growth in the monetary aggregates.
February 20 -,-to foster financial conditions conducive
to resisting inflationary pressures, cushioning
declines in production and employment that
are being induced in large part by the oil
situation, and maintaining equilibrium in the
country’s balance of payments,
---while taking account of international and domestic
financial market developments, the Committee seeks to
achieve bank reserve and money market conditions con-
sistent with moderate growth in monetary aggregates
over the months ahead,
Messrs. Bucher, Morris, and Sheehan expressed concern
about current and prospective weakness in aggregate
economic demands, .. -Mr. Francis expressed the view
that the over-all economic situation was stronger thon
suggested by the staff projections.
March 18-19 ., .to foster financial conditions conducive .--while taking account of international and domestic NONE
to resisting inflationary pressures, supporting a financial market developments, including the prospective
resumption of real economic growth, and main- Treasury financing, the Committee seeks to achieve bank
taming equilibrium in the country’s balance of
payments.
reserve and money market conditions that would moderate
growth in monetary aggregates over the months ahead,
April 15-16 NO CHANGE ., ,while taking account of the forthcoming Treasury
financing and of international and domestic financial
market developments, the Committee seeks to achieve
bank reserve and money market conditions that would
moderate growth in monetary aggregates over the months
ahead.
NONE
May 21 .,.to foster financial conditions conducive .. while taking account of developments in domestic NONE
to resisting inflationary pressures, supporting a and international financial markets, the Committee seeks
resumption of real economic growth, and ochiev-
ing equilibrium in the country’s balance of
to maintain about the prevailing restrictive money market
conditions, provided that the monetary aggregates appear
poyments. to be growing ot rates within the specified ranges of
tolerance.
June 18 NO CHANGE ,. .while taking account of developments in domestic
and international financial markets, the Committee seeks
to mointoin about the prevailing restrictive money market
Mr. Clay dissented from this action becouse he thought
that for too long the Committee hod accepted rates
of growth in the monetary aggregates that would
result in a continuing and growing inflation,
Absent and not voting Mr. Hayes. (Mr. Debs voted
as alternate for Mr. Hayes.)
conditions, provided that the monetary aggregates appear







Policy Consensus Operating Instructions Dissentswhile taking account of developments in domestic
and international financial markets, the Committee seeks
to achieve bonk reserve and money market conditions
consistent with moderate growth in monetary aggregates
over the months ahead.
Mr. Bucher said he favored maintaining a gen-
eratly restrictive policy stance in order to combat
inflation. However, he thought that that longer-run
oblective would be best served by seeking in the short
run to maintain growth in the monetary aggregates
at recent rates; in his view, further efforts to moderate
monetary growth at this point would involve an un-
duly high risk of creating economic conditions that
would necessitate a marked relaxation of policy.




September 10 NO CHANGE ..-while taking account of developments in domestic Mr. Hayes .-.observed that inflation and inflationary
and internationat financiat markets, the Committee seeks expectations continued unabated whereas the prob-
to achieve bank reserve and money market conditions abilities, in his view, were against the development
consistent with oderate g•r•~ Y!.!..h nmonetarv~fl~egates of a severe recession.
over the months ahead.
October NO CHANGE .. white taking account of the forthcoming treasury Mr. Clay ..-expressed the opinion that the recent
14-15 financing and of developments in domestic and inter-
national financial markets, the Committee seeks to achieve
bank reserve and money market conditions consistent with
resumption of moderate growth in monetary aggregates
over the months ahead.
.. .white taking account of devetopments in domestic
and international financial markets, the Committee seeks
to achieve bank reserve and money market conditions
consistent with moderate growth in monetary aggregates
over the months ahead.
shortfalls in growth of Mj were not due entirety to
the weakness in economic activity but were, at east
in part, a lagged response to the high levels of
short-term interest rates prevailing in the spring.
NONE November 19 NO CHANGE
December .. to foster financial conditions conducive .. white taking account of developments in domestic Messrs. Mitchell and Wollich ... both believed that
16-17 to resisting inflationary pressures, cushioning and international financial markets, the Committee seeks the economic situation and outlook catted far a more
recessionary tendencies and encouraging re- to achieve bank reserve and money market conditions stimulative monetary policy.
sumption of real economic growth, and achiev-
ing equilibrium in the country’s balance of
consistent with somewhat more rapid growth in monetary
aggregates over the months ahead than has occurred in
payments, recent months.
July 16 NO CHANGE while taking account of the forthcoming treasury
refunding and of devetapments in domestic and inter-
natianal financial markets, the Committee seeks to achieve
bank reserve and money market conditions that would
moderate growth in monetary aggregates over the months
ahead.
August 20 NO CHANGE NONE
Absent and not voting~ Mr. Brimmer.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS APRIL 1975
of the ranges that had been specified by the Commit-
tee.” During late April the rate at which Federal
funds were trading seemed likely to exceed the range
set at the April meeting and the System Account
Manager reported that “in order to bring the funds
rate back within the range of tolerance lie would have
to expand reserve-supplying operations, thus stimulat-
ing further growth of the monetary aggregates.”
On April 24, in view of the continued pressure in
the money market, and given the increase in the dis-
count rate announced that day by many Reserve
Banks, a majority of the Committee concurred in the
Chairman’s recommendation to raise the upper limit
of the Federal funds constraint ¼percentage point to
11 percent. Then, on May 17 “Chairman Burns recom-
mended that the Committee take note of the difficul-
ties faced by the System Account Manager in recent
days and, in view of the likelihood that those condi-
lions would persist over the next few days, that it
change the ceiling guideline for the funds rate from
11 to11¾ per cent.”
Between the April and May FOMC meetings, the
prime bank loan rate increased 6 times, rising from
10 to 115 percent. Interest rates on commercial paper
and large CDs also rose substantially during the inter-
meeting period. The steady rise in interest rates,
which began in late February, continued despite an
increase in the money stock at an 8.7 percent annual
rate in the three months immediately preceding the
May meeting.1 Member bank borrowings increased
almost $1.5 billion in the two weeks prior to the May
meeting.5
The Federal funds constraint adopted at the May
meeting permitted only a one-half of one percentage
point variance. The Committee “decided that — in
view of the sensitive state of financial markets and the
considerable tightening in money market conditions
that had occurred over recent months — greater em-
phasis than usual should be placed on money market
conditions during the period until the next meeting
A staff analysis at the May meeting suggested that
“the maintenance of prevailing money market condi-
TCompounded annual rate of change for the 4 weeks ending
Febnsary 13 to the 4 weeks ending May 15,
81n hearings before the Comsnittee on Banking and Currency
of the House of Representatives in July 1974, Alfred Hayes,
President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, stated
“taking the period from mid-May to mid-July, System open
market operations added approximately $1.2 billion to re-
serves and coincidentally Franklin’s borrowings from the
Federal Reserve Bank increased in about the same order of
magnitude.”
lions would be associated with a dampening in the
rate of growth of money because the demand for
money was likely to be restrained by the lagged ef-
fects of the sharp rise in short-term market rates of
interest” that had occurred recently. The Federal
funds range was widened to ¾percentage point on
June 10, as the upper limit was raised to 11¾ percent.
At the June meeting, the staff observed that the
existing money market conditions “would be associ-
ated with some slowing in the rate of growth of the
narrowly defined money stock over the months ahead,
because the demand for money was likely to be re-
strained by the lagged effects of the rise in short-term
market rates of interest that had occurred over the
past few months.” In view of these conditions the
Federal funds rate was allowed to vary between 11¼
percent and 12¼ percent in the period until the next
meeting. The ranges of tolerance adopted for M, and
M, for the June-July period were 3½ to 7½ percent
and 5½to 8½percent, respectively.
During the first half of 1974, the accompanying
charts indicate that the FOMC was successful in
FOMC Range for Federal Funds
Is
TI.. ;....H. .:i IJ~..iL if .tH.;:i..•.•.5
I,
FOMC Ranges of Tolerance tar Ml and M2
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achieving both the Federal funds rate and money
growth targets. The error in May in the aggregates
was very slight, especially when the four data revi-
sions during the year are considered. Also during May,
the Federal funds rate slightly exceeded its range.
The notable error in achieving the Federal funds
target came in late June and early July, but the
Committee tolerated this deviation. In a telephone
consultation on July 5 the Committee noted the Man-
ager’s report that”... the high level of the funds rate
was a reflection of the great uncertainty prevailing in
both domestic and foreign financial markets, com-
pounded by the effects of market transactions related
to the midyear statement date for banks and by the
July 4 holiday. In view of the likelihood that the high
level of the rate was primarily a consequence of tech-
nical factors that might well prove temporary, the
Committee concluded that there was no immediate
need to press hard to bring the funds rate down
within the specified range of tolerance,”
Chairman Arthur Burns commented before the
Joint Economic Committee in early August that
“clearly, the American economy is not being starved
for funds. On the contrary, growth of money and
credit is still proceeding at a faster rate than is con-
sistent with general price stability over the longer
term.” Based on current data, the growth of the money
stock was at a 10.9 percent annual rate during June.
According to the “Record of Policy Actions” a major
part of the step-up was attributable to a temporary
increase in foreign official deposits arising from pay-
ments to oil exporters.”
At the Atsgust meeting, “a staff analysis suggested
that the unusually slow pace of monetary growth in
July was not likely to persist in view of the continued
sizable rate of growth in prospect for nominal CNP;
in fact, data available for early August indicated that
some strengthening had occurred already.” The range
of tolerance for M5 and M, was only 2 percentage
points for the August-September period, compared
with the 4 percentage point spread for M, during
the July-August period.
The Board of Governors announced on September
4 the removal of its 3 percent marginal reserve re-
quirement on certificates of deposit in denominations
of $100,000 or more with maturities of four months or
“As stated, this statement implies that domestically-owned
U. S. demtsncl deposits did isot simultaneously decline as a
result of the transactions with foreign oil producers.
longer. The action reduced the volume of required
reserves by about $400 million.
Although many of the economists at the White
House Summit Conference in early September called
for monetary ease, Edwin L. Dale, Jr., of the New
York Times reported that “high Federal Reserve offi-
cials have gone out of their way to point out, for the
first time, that the Reserve’s highly restrictivemonetary
policy has already been eased to a significant degree,
and they add that no ‘substantial’ further easing is to
be expected.” The money stock grew at a 1.5 percent
annual rate from June to August compared to the 6.7
percent growth in the first half of the year. The ranges
for M, and M, were 3 and2½ percentage points wide,
respectively, for the September-October period. The
Federal funds range established at the September
meeting was less than the range established at the
August meeting.
At the October meeting the one-month range of
tolerance for the Federal funds rate was lowered
considerably, and the October-November ranges for
M1 and M2 were somewhat higher than the ranges
set for the September-October period. In November
the two-month ranges of tolerance for the aggregates
were somewhat higher than they were in October.
Throughout the last three months of 1974, the one-
month range of tolerance for the Federal funds rate
was reduced,
The growth rates of both M1 and M2 were within
the desired ranges in only one month during the
second half of the year. The Federal funds rate, how-
ever, followed closely the ranges established at each
meeting (see accompanying charts).
There are two alternative, but not necessarily in-
consistent, reasons for the frequent failure of the
growth rates of M5 and M1 to be within their specified
ranges last year. One reason was the complication of
having a Federal funds constraint as well as a mone-
tary aggregate growth target. The other was an un-
anticipated change in the relationslnp of the growth
of M1 and M, to growth of the monetary base.
The problem created by having specified ranges of
tolerance for both the monetary aggregates and the
Federal funds rate is illustrated in Figure I. Line I
represents a hypothetical projected relationship be-
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tween the Federal funds rate and the associated
rate of change in money made by the FOMC staff and
considered in the Committee’s deliberations.mo This
relationship is based mainly on a projection of
growth of GNP. According to the relationship, given
the projected growth of CNP, the level of the Fed-
eral funds rate and the growth of money are inversely
related,
For illustration, assume that the consensus of the
meeting is that a Federal funds rate between 6 and 7
percent will be sought. According to the projected
relationship this implies that the growth of money
during the two-month interval will be between 5 and
8 percent. Assuming that such a range of money
growth is deemed acceptable, open market opera-
tions which maintain the Federal funds rate within
its range would be expected to result in money growth
within its range of tolerance.
A problem associated with this approach is that the
projected relationship between alternative Federal
funds rates and associated growth rates of money
(Line I) is not known with certainty. Suppose that
the actual growth of GNP is not as high as projected,
and that the actual growth would yield a set of rela-
tionships represented by Line II. If such were the
case, adherence to the 6 percent lower limit for the
Federal funds rate would be expected to result in
only a 2 percent rate of money growth — 3 percentage
points below its lower range of tolerance. Or, adher-
ence to the 5 percent lower limit for growth in money
would be expected to result in a 5 percent Federal
funds rate, which is less than its lower limit of toler-
ance. In such a situation, a choice must be made re-
garding which range of tolerance is to be achieved.
The existence of such a situation, as depicted in
Figure I, may account in part for the failure of money
growth rates to be within their ranges of tolerance in
the second half of 1974. Most forecasters did not
project the decrease in the rate of growth of GNP,
with the result that a wrong projection would be made
of the money market relationships. Consequently, a
choice had to be made regarding which of the two
ranges of tolerance was to be achieved. The actual
outcome was achievement of a Federal funds rate
within its’ range, but the monetary aggregates were
outside of their ranges.
mama relationship is discussed in Stephen H- Axitrod and
Darwin L. Beck, “Role of Projections and Data Evaluation
with Monetary Aggregates as Policy Targets,” Controlling
Monetary Aggregates II: The Implementation, Federal Re-
serve Bank of Boston, pp. 81-102.
Figure I
Projected Money Market Relationships
for a Projected Growth of GNP
Normally, the growth of the money stock is about
the same as the growth of the monetary base over
periods of one year or more, but in 1974 the 5,3 per-
cent growth of money was considerably slower than
the 8.4 percent growth of the base.11 Part of the djver-
gence in these rates of growth can be attributed to the
15 percent growth of time deposits during the year.
When reserves are supplied to the banking system,
they may be used to support either time or demand
deposits. The expansion of time deposits in 1974 ab-
sorbed a large volume of reserves, leaving fewer re-
serves available to support an expansion of demand
deposits. Some growth in time deposits occurs regu-
larly, but the more-rapid-than-usual growth of time
deposits in 1974 resulted in a smaller-than-expected
multiplier between monetary base and the money
stock.
An additional factor contributing to the discrepancy
in the growth rates of the monetary base and the
money stock was the exceptionally large increase in
the volume of currency held by the public. Althongh
the money stock increased only about 5.3 percent in
1974, the currency component increased almost twice
as fast as M5, while demand deposits grew at only a
3.9 percent rate.
Currency is the largest use of monetary base and,
by itself, has a multiplier of unity in “creating money.”
“Percentages were calculated from fourth quarter 1973 to
fourth quarter 1974.
2% 5% 8% Rate of Change
in Money
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TaMe I
Comparison of Origmal curd Revised Senes
Settsonalty Ad~usted
M M
2 First Carrent First Current
1974 Published Se ‘es Published Se ne
January $269 7 $ 70 9< $573 & $575 5
February 272 6 273.1 580 1 5809<
March 274.9 27 .2 584.3 585.5
April 2767 276.6 588 & 589.4
May 279 3 277.6 59<2 9 591 4
June 2809 2800 5974 597.1
.luy 2812 2805 400.2 99.7
August 280 8 28 7 602 2 602i
September 2809 2811 6033 6038
Octebet 281 9 282.2 608J 608.1
Nevenibe 2833 2838 6127 613,0
December 2836 284.3 6138 6143
TI, Cure Sen nthaI tIn chum 017 eitoao
e In an ‘ St Pub hed urea
ad cc C, hat ma iehsed by tIn Boant I
arts Ijedotmedn nan alt diomsean
In s Mon on flat below Us ted lInt aa
co,apa,rable beeau ot these s ens
A dollar increase in the monetary base that is matched
by a dollar increase in currency also increa es the
money stock (currency plus demand depo its), hut
only by one dollar. An increase in currency creates no
multiple expansion between monetary base and the
money stock, To the extent that the extraordinary
increases in currency and the resulting fall in the
multiplier were unanticipated last year, growth of
money was less than one would have expected.
A purely technical uncertainty regarding growth of
the money stock also occurred last year. This uncer-
tainty stems from the fact that data on the money
stock were revised four times during 1974. Policy-
makers took actions based on the reported growth of
the money stock, but later revisions in the data may
have indicated different conclusions than preliminary
figures. One major source of revision in the data on
the money stock is that actual nonmember bank data
are available only four times-a year, and must he
estimated during the remainder of the year. Table I
presents the revisions in the money stock data for
1974.
Few, if any, economic analysts foresaw the 5 per-
cent decline in real output which occurred during
1974. Few predictions in late 1973 indicated a 12 per-
cent increase in prices or over a 7 percent unemploy-
ment rate by year’s end. The FOMC staffdid no worse
of a job projecting economic activity than most private
forecasters. Controversies and uncertainties existed
last year regarding the appropriate growth of mone-
tary aggregates. Those who viewed the downturn as
demand-induced recommended faster money growth,
while others, who viewed the recession as supply-
induced and recognized the seriousness of accelerat-
ing inflation, argued for slower money growth.
In the first half of last year M1 increased at a 6.7
percent rate and M, at a 9,3 percent rate. The Fed-
eral funds rate increased during the same period from
9.65 percent in January to 11.93 percent in June, on a
monthly average basis, The growth of the monetary
aggregates and the rise in the Federal funds rate
were almost consistently within the ranges of toler-
ance specified by the FOMC.
In the second half of 1974, the rates of growth for
M1 and M2 were 3.9 and 6.5 percent, respectively.
The Federal funds rate fell from 11,93 percent in June
to an average of 8.53 percent in December. The
growth rates of the monetary aggregates were, for the
most part, well below the FOMC two-month ranges
of tolerance, while the Federal funds rate again was
almost always within the specified ranges.
Even in retrospect, analysts are uncertain as to how
to evaluate monetary policy last year. Such an evalua-
tion depends on the measure used as an indicator of
the influence of policy on the economy. Those who
believe that the Federal funds rate is a good indicator
concluded last year that the thrust of policy was re-
strictive in the first half, but less so in the second half.
On the other hand, those who use growth of money
as an indicator would conclude that monetary actions
were expansionary in the first half and restrictive in
the second.
Last year was unlike any previous year. Inflation
and recession both became more severe than anyone
foresasv early in the year. With the array of different
anmalyses that existed, it is only fitting that 1974 be
labelled the “year of uncertainty”.
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